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PRODUCT LIABILITY-The Protection of Strict Product
Liability Held to Extend to an Injured Party Who is Neither
a User Nor a Purchaser.
On February 22, 1968, Holly J. White was employed by the Pea-
body Coal Co. as a repairman and electrician in its Eagle Mine No. 1 in
Shawneetown, Illinois. On that day a ram car owned by his employer,
and manufactured by Jeffery Gallion, Inc. ran out of control, breaking
a high pressure air hose. The hose then struck him, causing serious
and permanent injuries. White brought suit against Jeffery Gallion in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois, al-
leging that the cause of the accident was a defective steering valve in
the ram car.'
The defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that White
had admitted that he was not a purchaser or user, but was merely a
bystander, and that under Illinois law, a bystander is not entitled to re-
cover under the theory of strict product liability.
The court, through Chief Judge Juergens, denied the defendant's
motion, and held that Illinois law did extend the protection of strict
liability to bystanders. In his analysis, Judge Juergens relied essenti-
ally on the landmark case of Suvada v. White Motor Co.,2 which:
[Ljaid to rest the privity defense in actions against manufactur-
ers, sellers, contractors, etc., and held these parties to strict priv-
ity-free liability for any injury or damage caused by any unrea-
sonably dangerous products which one or all of them might place
in the stream of commerce insofar as users and consumers are
concerned.3
The court examined Wright v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.4 which com-
pared the state of the law with that prior to Suvada. The Wright
court had cited Murphy v. Cory Pump & Supply Co.5 as an example
of the type of decision which Suvada seeks to remedy. In Murphy, a
seven year old girl lost her leg when she fell in front of a power mower.
1. White v. Jeffrey-Galion, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Ill., 1971).
2. 32 I11. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
3. 326 F. Supp. at 753.
4. 68 I1. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (5th Dist., 1966).
5. 47 111. App. 2d 382, 197 N.E.2d 849 (4th Dist., 1964).
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The Murphy court had granted summary judgment for the defendant
manufacturer on the basis that there was no privity between the
plaintiff and defendant. Judge Juergens pointed out that it is in-
congruous to hold that a user or consumer has a right of action, but
that an injured bystander, totally without fault, may not have this same
protection. The defense of lack of privity, denied a defendant in a
suit by a nonpurchaser user, should be of no more validity in a suit by
an injured bystander. The court denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, and extended the full protection of strict product
liability to an innocent bystander.
The result seems reasonable, for if two people are standing side by
side, and a defective product causes identical injuries to both of them,
why should one be entitled to recover because he purchased the prod-
uct, while the other be without remedy because he neither bought the
product nor was using it?'
While the decision of the district court may be a valid extension of
the decision in Suvada, at least one aspect of strict product liability
law seems to have received little or no attention in the cases which
have extended its protection. Although the court in Suvada correctly
stated that such liability does not make the defendant manufacturer
an absolute insurer, the fact is that the immediate effect of products
liability is proceeding directly toward that very result. At some point
in the future it is quite possible that anyone who manufactures any-
thing will have become an insurer of absolutely everyone. It would
seem reasonable that before the scope of liability is widened to this ex-
tent, the goals sought to be achieved be defined and delineated. It
is true that an innocent person who is injured by a defective product
should be able to look elsewhere to be made whole, but it is also
true that society could suffer economically if such a large unexpected
financial burden is placed upon the free enterprise system.
A HISTORICAL VIEW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY
In order to understand the reasoning of the court in extending strict
product liability protection by bystanders, it is necessary to review the
history of this area of the law for two reasons. First, the ruling was
essentially the result of prior rulings, each building upon those be-
fore it. Each new decision has widened the protection afforded those
6. For an excellent example of this illogical result, see Caruth v. Mariana, 11
Ariz. App. 188, 463 P.2d 83 at 86 (1970).
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innocently injured by a defective product, culminating in protection
to the injured bystander. Second, strict product liability is not merely
an extension of previous protections afforded those injured by a defec-
tive product. It differs in theory from the earlier forms of protection,
and, in order to fully appreciate this difference, it is first necessary to
examine the aspects of those protections which preceeded strict product
liability.
The historical origin of the problem of product liability is Lord
Abinger's ill-advised and much-maligned decision in Winterbottom v.
Wright.7 In Winterbottom, the Postmaster General hired the defend-
ant, Wright, to supply and maintain coaches for carrying the mail.
The defendant then contracted with Winterbottom's employer to furn-
ish drivers for the coaches. The coach which Winterbottom was driv-
ing fell over, thereby injuring him. His own employer was innocent,
for he had merely supplied the drivers. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity precluded suit against the Postmaster General. As a result,
Winterbottom had nowhere to look for recovery except to Wright. Fur-
thermore, Wright was the logical object of Winterbottom's complaint
because he had contractual liability for maintenance of the coaches.
Unfortunately for Winterbottom, he lacked privity with Wright and
could not maintain a suit in contract. His only alternative was a neg-
ligence suit in tort against Wright.
Lord Abinger may have been more astute than his critics have ad-
mitted when he said, "(I)f the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or
even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the upset-
ting of the coach, might bring a similar action."8  Although Lord
Abinger could not have envisoned today's technology and mobility,
he feared that those liable in tort on a faulty product might become
insurers. Unfortunately, his solution was to deny the carriage driver
recovery. "Unless we confine our operation of such contracts as this
to the parties who enter into them, the most absurd and outrageous
consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensure."9  Thus, the
court made privity of contract a necessary element in a cause of ac-
tion arising out of injuries caused by a defective product. Lord
Abinger's solution essentially meant that Winterbottom's employer, had
he been riding in the carriage, could have recovered, while Winterbot-
tom himself could not. Although Lord Abinger's fears may have been
7. 10 M &W 109 (1842).
8. Id. at 113.
9. Id.
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well-founded, his solution has proven unsatisfactory. The history of
product liability has been the attempts of the courts to free those in-
nocently injured by a defective product from the restrictive require-
ments of contract law.
The traditional rationale employed by the courts to avoid Lord
Abinger's privity limitation was to leave the Winterbottom rule intact,
but to create ever-increasing exceptions which eventually destroyed the
rule. The exceptions were embodied in two principle categories-prod-
ucts for human consumption and inherently dangerous products.
The exception of products for human consumption had its beginning
in Illinois in 189810 when the Illinois Supreme Court held that the rule
of caveat emptor would be replaced by an implied warranty that ran
with the sale by a retailer to one who purchased food or drink with
intent of immediate consumption. The warranty ran beyond the pur-
chaser to his family, thus allowing those not in privity with the seller
to recover for injuries.
By 1915, the "food and drink exception" had been refined to allow
the injured party to sue in negligence with no requirement to plead
or prove any contract theory.1 This cause of action was limited to
products sealed by the dealer, undoubtedly to avoid the intervening neg-
ligence of third parties. The theory advanced to justify this expansion
of liability was that the dealer was under a duty to sell his product
in a wholesome condition.
In 1920, the Iowa Supreme Court, in another sealed product case,' 2
had occasion to review the necessity of privity, express and implied
warranties, and negligence. It held that privity and express warranties
were not necessary, and that recovery could be based upon negligence
or breach of an implied warranty. It did not matter which theory was
chosen by the plaintiff, as long as he could prove the necessary ele-
ments of that theory.
The inherently dangerous product exception to the privity rule
arose in New York state only ten years after Winterbottom. The de-
fendant had substituted a poisonous substance for extract of dande-
lion. The court held that when a defective product put human life
in imminent danger, it was not necessary to establish privity. The
plaintiff could sue in tort on the theory of negligence.' 3  In 1916, in
10. 171 IU. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1898).
11. Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 80 (1915).
12. David v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920).
13. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.E. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
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MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co."4 Justice Cordozo ruled that the negli-
gence exception to the privity rule extended to a "thing of danger"
which could .foreseeably be used by one other than the purchaser.
In 1960, a New Jersey court held that an injured party, if a user or
purchaser, was permitted to claim that the defendant was liable for
breach of an implied warranty even though he lacked privity with the
defendant.1" The claim of implied warranty was permitted to stand,
even though disclaimed in the contract, because the court felt that the
express warranties were illusory and actually deprived the plaintiff of re-
covery. As a result of these developments, a purchaser or user who
had been injured by a defective product was able to recover either in
tort or under an implied warranty, even though he lacked privity with
the defendant, and even though the defendant had attempted to limit
any implied warranties.
These bases for recovery, although more acceptable to an injured
plaintiff than the Winterbottom privity limitation, still created barriers
to a claim by an innocent injured party. The plaintiff must either
prove negligence or a warranty, implied if not express. These barriers
still provided a sizeable shield to the defendant. However, because
of the trend toward allowing the injured party to recover, a further
liberalization seemed logical. It occurred in the California case of
Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc.16
In Greenman, the plaintiff had been injured while using a power tool
which had been manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff's wife
had purchased the tool as a gift for her husband. Justice Traynor,
writing for the California Supreme Court, noted that because the
necessity for the plaintiff to establish privity had been eliminated,
product liability was purely a tort action. On that basis, the require-
ment that the plaintiff rely upon an implied warranty was a legal fic-
tion-a vestige of the law of contracts which arose from the need to
show privity. Furthermore, Justice Traynor made it clear that the
plaintiff need not prove that the defendant had been negligent in the
manufacture of the product. Strict liability was imposed upon the
manufacturer as a consequence of placing his product in the stream
of commerce, Justice Traynor ruled that in order to recover, the plain-
tiff need prove that the defendant's product was defective, and had
caused the injury and that the plaintiff was unaware of the defect.
14. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
15. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
16. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
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Product liability in Illinois has essentially followed this historical
pattern. The privity limitation of Winterbottom had been accepted,
and the exceptions of products for human consumption 17 and inher-
ently dangerous products'8 were created and expanded. The most sig-
nificant product liability case in Illinois is Suvada v. White Motor Co."9
In Suvada, the plaintiff had purchased a reconditioned tractor from
White for use in his milk distributing business. The brakes failed,
causing the tractor to collide with a Chicago Transit Authority bus.
The plaintiff sued for costs of repair to his tractor, and the cost of
his tort settlement with the bus passengers. From a judgment for
Suvada, only Bendix-Westinghouse Air Brake Co., the manufacturer
of the brakes, appealed.
In its decision, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that in the sale of
food, product liability ran from the seller to the injured consumer as a
matter of public policy. It listed the interests of the public which
dictated this result: concern for life and health, the seller's responsi-
bility for putting the product into the flow of commerce, and the social
justice of imposing the loss upon the one creating the risk and enjoying
the profit. The court concluded that these interests also exist in re-
spect to defective products which are unreasonably dangerous to the
user, and thus product liability should be extended accordingly. For
these reasons, the court ruled that negligence was no longer necessary
for recovery and, expressing its approval of Greenman v. Yuba Prod-
ucts, Inc., held that implied warranties, being aspects of contract law,
have no meaning in strict liability in tort.
The Suvada decision, and thus, the status of product liability in Illi-
nois prior to its extension to bystanders, may be summarized as extend-
ing to any of a number of classes of defendants including manufactur-
ers, sellers, independent contractors, suppliers, component parts manu-
facturers, and those who hold themselves out to be manufacturers. 20
It covers, as a matter of law, without regard to warranties or negli-
gence, any product which is unreasonably dangerous to the user,2' and
defect of design or manufacture. It pertains to both personal injury
and property damage. 2 The plaintiff must prove, to establish a
prima facie case, (1) that the injury or damage resulted from a defect
17. Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1898).
18. Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 331 Il1. 78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928).
19. 32 11. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
20. Id. at 617, 210 N.E.2d at 185.
21. Id. at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
22. Id. at 621, 210 N.E.2d at 187.
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of the product; (2) that the condition was unreasonably dangerous;
and (3) that the condition existed at the time it left the manufactur-
er's possession.23
The defenses available to the accused under strict product liability
were enunciated in Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co. 24  The plaintiff was
injured while operating a trenching tool, and sued the manufacturer.
The court rejected contributory negligence as a defense because it did
not denote a high enough degree of culpability to bar recovery. How-
ever, the court did recognize two defenses-misuse of the product, and
assumption of risk. As to assumption of risk, the prudent man stand-
ard was rejected, and the trier of fact directed to apply a subjective
analysis to the plaintiff himself. Regardless of his protestations, he
must be evaluated in the light of his knowledge, experience, and per-
sonal circumstances.2" The court also indicated that the plaintiff's
misuse of the product, which is not reasonably foreseeable by the de-
fendant will preclude recovery.26
EXTENSION TO BYSTANDERS
Prior to the Illinois extension of product liability protection to by-
standers, eleven jurisdictions had ruled that injured bystanders were so
protected. The two most significant "bystander" cases are the Michi-
gan case of Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co.27 and the California
case of Elmore v. American Motors Co.28 Piercefield is significant
because it was the first case to allow a bystander to recover in a
products liability suit. However, the recovery was not based upon
strict product liability, but upon negligence.
Elmore, by far the more significant of the two cases, was the first
case to award recovery to a bystander in a strict liability case. In
Elmore, the California court relied primarily upon Greenman v. Yuba
Products, Inc.29 It reasoned that because Greenman had precluded any
23. Id. at 188. The third burden, that of proving that the defect existed at the
time it left the defendant's possession, is the most difficult. However, it seems far
from insurmountable. A possible indication of the difficulty of this burden might be
gleaned from Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162
(1st Dist., 1947) wherein the plaintiff became ill upon discovering a dead mouse at the
bottom of the previously sealed bottle. The court ruled that the plaintiff had proven
a prima facie case by showing that the mouse was in the bottle and the bottle was
sealed. Bear in mind that in some other jurisdiction this evidence might be called
res ipsa loquitur.
24. 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
25. Id. at 430, 261 N.E.2d at 312.
26. Id. at 425, 261 N.E.2d at 309.
27. 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
28. 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84 (1969).
29. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
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necessity for privity or warranty, and had held the manufacturer strictly
liable in tort, there was no reason to limit the defendant's liability
to users and purchasers. A bystander is within the definition of
Greenman, a human being who does not suspect the defect, does not
misuse the product, and is innocently injured as a result of the product
defect. Accordingly, he is entitled to protection. Of the other juris-
dictions which extended product liability to bystanders prior to the
White decision, one based its ruling upon implied warranty,3 0 two
based their rulings on negligence,3' one based its ruling on both im-
plied warranty and negligence,"2 and following Elmore, five have ex-
tended strict product liability to bystanders.3
In White, the district court, in interpreting strict product liability
in Illinois as extending to bystanders, adopted a line of reasoning similar
to that of the California court in Elmore. Just as the California Su-
preme Court had held that the Greenman definition of strict product
liability logically encompassed bystanders, the district court held that
the Suvada definition accomplished the same result. Protection
should be extended to anyone injured by an unreasonably dangerous
product, if such defect existed when the product left the manufac-
turer's possession. The absence of the pivity requirement eliminates
the only logical bar to anyone who can carry this burden, whether he
be a% user, a purchaser, or anyone else.3 4
STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY-To WHAT EXTENT Is THE
SELLER Now LIABLE?
To fully appreciate the current status of strict product liability, re-
lated factors must be considered. For example, in Gray v. American
Radiator and Sanitary Corp.3 5 defendant Titan Valve Co. of Ohio had
manufactured a valve which it sold to a radiator manufacturer in Penn-
30. Lenzick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
The court referred to the plaintiff as a user, but he was actually a non-user, non-
purchaser. While working in his employer's building, he was injured by a defective
roof which the defendant had constructed.
31. Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969). Dean v.
General Motors Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. La. 1969).
32. Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Sup. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965).
33. Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1968); Klimas v. Interna-
tional Telephone & Telegraph Co., 257 F. Supp. 937 (D.R. I. 1969); Wasik v. Borg,
423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970); Caruth v. Mariana, 11 Ariz. App. 188, 463 P.2d 83
(1970); Lamendala v. Mizell, 115 N.J. Super. 514, 280 A.2d 241 (1971).
34. Mieher v. Brown, - Ill. App. 3d -, 278 N.E.2d 869 (1972), decided shortly
after the White case also extended strict liability protection to non-purchasers, non-
users.
35. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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sylvania. The Pennsylvania company shipped the radiator containing
the Titan Valve to an Illinois distributor, and eventually, it was pur-
chased by Mrs. Gray. The radiator exploded, causing her injuries, and
she sued in negligence. Titan Valve Co. was a co-defendant, and she
alleged its valve to be defective. Titan's registered agent was served
in Cleveland, Ohio, under the Illinois "long arm" statute.3 6 Titan ap-
peared specially to contest the jurisdiction of the court. The court
held that there was minimum contact with the state, and that, under
Illinois law, the place where the last act occurs to render the defendant
liable is the place where the tort is committed. Thus, the explosion
constituted a tort by the defendant in Illinois, and personal jurisdic-
tion was properly established.
The significance of "long arm" statutes in general, and the Gray
decision in particular, as they relate to strict product liability become
apparent by varying slightly the facts of the Gray case. Assume Mrs.
Black, while visiting Mrs. Gray, is injured by the explosion. The Ti-
tan Valve Co., a citizen of Ohio, then finds itself served with a sum-
mons to appear and defend itself in Illinois against a plaintiff who
has neither purchased, nor used Titan's product. Based upon the
Gray opinion, the Illinois court has personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant.
At trial, the defendant will be permitted to assert the affirma-
tive defenses of assumption of risk and misuse of product. Is it pos-
sible for a bystander to do either? In some situations, it is possible
for a bystander to assume the risk. For example, one who chooses to
be near a product, with full knowledge of the product's defects, and
is then injured by it, is a bystander who has assumed the risk. It
must be conceded, however, that under this standard, few bystanders,
as compared with users and consumers, can assume the risk. As to
this particular plaintiff, Mrs. Black, it could not be claimed that she
had assumed any risk at all.
Similarly, the defense of misuse of the product is of no avail to the
defendant. It is difficult to envision how someone who must, by defi-
nition, be a non-user, can at the same time be a mis-user. Further-
more, even assuming Mrs. Gray had misused the product, it does not
appear that the defendant may, consistent with the reasoning and
policy of the Suvada decision, assert this defense against the plaintiff-
non-user. The court in Suvada had noted that "losses should be
36. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 110, §§ 16 and 17(1)(6).
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borne by those who created the risk and reaped the profit ..
Thus, Titan is without the normal product liability defenses. If
Mrs. Black can show that the valve was defective before it left Titan's
possession, that the defect was unreasonably dangerous, and that it
was the cause of the injury, she may recover. Actually, her burden
is to show that the defect existed while the valve was in Titan's
possession, because the mere fact of the explosion would itself show
an unreasonable danger and the cause of injury. By showing that
the valve exploded and that it was a sealed unit which was not tam-
pered with by subsequent manufacturers or dealers, she has proven her
case.
Finally, the question of whether the defendant may seek indemni-
fication from the negligent user is, as yet, unresolved. It is settled
that indemnification back through the chain of distribution is proper.
However, an Illinois case dealing with indemnification in strict liability
suits indicates that the usual concepts of active and passive negligence38
will not be considered.
[W]e agree with the . . . contention that Suvada intended to
eliminate the fault weighing process of active-passive negligence
in determining any grant of indemnity relief.39
This reasoning would seem to disallow any action by the defendant-
manufacturer to recover against the negligent user. This result, how-
ever, appears highly incongruous and unjust in light of the fact that
misuse is a defense in a strict liability action.
Thus, today, a component part manufacturer in Ohio, who sells his
product in Pennsylvania, can ultimately find himself liable, in Illinois,
to someone who has not even purchased or used his product. The
defendant is probably without a defense nor possibility of recoup-
ment, and the plaintiff need not prove negligence.
Perhaps this result is best. If one is responsible for damages in-
curred by another, then certainly he, and not the innocent victim,
should bear the loss.
However, consider what is occurring. The extension of strict prod-
uct liability to bystanders has made sellers and manufacturers of de-
fective products liable to everyone. By extending protection to pur-
37. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965).
38. See Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967); Sergent v.
Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 I11. App. 2d 187, 229 N.E.2d 769 (1967).
39. Texaco v. McGreen, 117 Ill. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1969).
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chasers, users, and everyone else, protection has been extended to the
whole world.
At what point does the manufacturer become an insurer? Perhaps
he is now. To be an insurer one does not necessarily incur -un-
limited liability. An insurer may, by contract, limit his liability within
the bounds prescribed by law. A defendant in products liability is not
so fortunate. Any warranties, or limits thereon, although they may be
ethical and acceptable under the law of sales, are of no merit in strict
product liability where contract rules have been rejected. Even protec-
tions usually afforded the defendant by tort law are of no avail. A
defendant may prove that he was extremely careful (and thus non-neg-
ligent), and such proof will have no bearing on the outcome. Es-
sentially, the defendant's only protection is that the plaintiff may not
be able to prove that the defect existed while in the defendant's pos-
session. It might be possible for the defendant to show that the in-
jured party assumed the risk, but as we have seen, very few, if any,
bystanders would assume any risk at all.
Strict product liability is, of course, intended to give a remedy to a
party who is injured by a defective product. Under the current state
of the law, even in an action between two innocent parties, the seller
of the product and the one injured thereby, the law intends that the
injured shall be compensated. However, there are weaknesses to this
story. For instance, there is no assurance that the successful plaintiff
will be able to recover his damages should he win his judgment. If
the defendant is small or financially weak, the plaintiff may succeed in
having spent much time and money only to put the defendant out of
business. Also, potential entrepreneurs may be deterred from estab-
lishing their own businesses. A person who starts a business with
few assets and a significant amount of debt could find himself liable
for a defective product before he can become established enough to
survive the suit.
Perhaps an answer is a form of products liability insurance which is
similar to workmen's compensation. Liability insurance which protects
the manufacturer from claims by injured parties, without maximum li-
ability limits, might be prohibitive in cost to him. However, if he
were to be required by statute to carry product liability insurance, and
if his liability (including such factors as pain and suffering) were lim-
ited by the statute, then the party injured by the defendant's product
would be assured of recovery with less of a necessity to resort to the
431,
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courts. As to the manufacturer, he could satisfy his liability in an
orderly manner based upon a predictable cost of doing business-
an insurance premium rather than an unexpected law suit. Some-
where between the philosophy of Winterbottom and that of our prin-
cipal case there must be a reasonable answer.
RicHARD R. MiCHELSON
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